1. how is the “proposal agreement determined”?
2. is the amount of collateral refers to the amount of the budget associated with the respective proposal?

A more serious example is when the same thing happens but instead of a token listing, an attacker can make a vote to transfer all the vault to their own address this is the primary motivation of the court

does it mean that the original proposer need to send the original budget back to the DAO or to the disputes

Not sure what you mean here. But all agreements are fully collateralized. Meaning you can only loose what you have staked. If you make a proposal and stake funds towards it, you can only loose that. A DAO cannot compel you so send it anymore than that

As for the amount of collateral @jorge @facuspagnuolo would be best to answer that. Hope that helps

1. Community member make a proposal seeking for fund support from the DAO like 100 usdt, does he/she need to collateral some DAO token into the smart contract? and if yes , how much that could be
2. In this situation , if the proposal is passed, he will be granted 100 usdt, and will he get his collateral back?
3. In this situation, if the proposal is raised for any dispute here, and he lose in the dispute, does it mean that he will lose both his collateral and the fund he applied for?

Ok let me try and unpack it a bit with a disclaimer that I’m not an expert on this and I haven’t looked at the current spec

Community member make a proposal seeking for fund support from the DAO like 100 usdt, does he/she need to collateral some DAO token into the smart contract? and if yes, how much that could be

This would be up to the DAO and how it is configured. If you have the permissions set up such that anyone can request funds via voting then it makes sense for the DAO to require a deposit for each proposal (this is not an option right now with the current apps on the main net). The reason being the DAO is vulnerable to a spam attack where an attacker can flood the DAO with proposals hoping one of them sneak through.

In the case where the proposer challenges a no vote. For example, if it was a request for payment for services rendered and they did the work they were tasked with. then they would receive the deposit back and the requested funds and possibly a portion of the DAOs deposit (don’t quote me on the last one)

However, if they lose they will lose their deposit. It’s worth noting, they would never have had the funds applied for as it would be locked by the court

If you have the permissions set up such that only token holders in the DAO can request funds from the vault via voting, then it probably wouldn’t need to require depositing collateral as if a token holder is acting maliciously the DAO can vote to burn its tokens.

Again this could trigger a dispute at which point both parties would have to deposit collateral with the looser getting slashed

And here is the issue I raised about the “intention dispute”, if the disputer will receive the collateral of the original proposer, he /she might be incentivised to raise dispute even the proposal has not fully broken the " proposal agreement"

You are never incentivised to raise malicious disputes. Yes the disputer may get some of the deposit of the other party but if the court functions correctly they will, in fact, lose money

That’s kind of a long answer but to your first question on how much must be staked to raise a dispute in the court. I’m not sure

Ok let me try and unpack it a bit with a disclaimer that I’m not an expert on this and I haven’t looked at the current spec

Community member make a proposal seeking for fund support from the DAO like 100 usdt, does he/she need to collateral some DAO token into the smart contract? and if yes, how much that could be

This would be up to the DAO and how it is configured. If you have the permissions set up such that anyone can request funds via voting then it makes sense for the DAO to require a deposit for each proposal (this is not an option right now with the current apps on the main net). The reason being the DAO is vulnerable to a spam attack where an attacker can flood the DAO with proposals hoping one of them sneak through.

In the case where the proposer challenges a no vote. For example, if it was a request for payment for services rendered and they did the work they were tasked with. then they would receive the deposit back and the requested funds and possibly a portion of the DAOs deposit (don’t quote me on the last one)

However, if they lose they will lose their deposit. It’s worth noting, they would never have had the funds applied for as it would be locked by the court

If you have the permissions set up such that only token holders in the DAO can request funds from the vault via voting, then it probably wouldn’t need to require depositing collateral as if a token holder is acting maliciously the DAO can vote to burn its tokens.

Again this could trigger a dispute at which point both parties would have to deposit collateral with the looser getting slashed

And here is the issue I raised about the “intention dispute”, if the disputer will receive the collateral of the original proposer, he /she might be incentivised to raise dispute even the proposal has not fully broken the " proposal agreement"

You are never incentivised to raise malicious disputes. Yes the disputer may get some of the deposit of the other party but if the court functions correctly they will, in fact, lose money

That’s kind of a long answer but to your first question on how much must be staked to raise a dispute in the court. I’m not sure

Ok let me try and unpack it a bit with a disclaimer that I’m not an expert on this and I haven’t looked at the current spec

“Community member make a proposal seeking for fund support from the DAO like 100 usdt, does he/she need to collateral some DAO token into the smart contract? and if yes, how much that could be”

This would be up to the DAO and how it is configured. If you have the permissions set up such that anyone can request funds via voting then it makes sense for the DAO to require a deposit for each proposal (this is not an option right now with the current apps on the main net). The reason being the DAO is vulnerable to a spam attack where an attacker can flood the DAO with proposals hoping one of them sneak through.

In the case where the proposer challenges a no vote. For example, if it was a request for payment for services rendered and they did the work they were tasked with. then they would receive the deposit back and the requested funds and possibly a portion of the DAOs deposit (don’t quote me on the last one)

However, if they lose they will lose their deposit. It’s worth noting, they would never have had the funds applied for as it would be locked by the court

If you have the permissions set up such that only token holders in the DAO can request funds from the vault via voting, then it probably wouldn’t need to require depositing collateral as if a token holder is acting maliciously the DAO can vote to burn its tokens.

Again this could trigger a dispute at which point both parties would have to deposit collateral with the looser getting slashed

“And here is the issue I raised about the “intention dispute”, if the disputer will receive the collateral of the original proposer, he /she might be incentivised to raise dispute even the proposal has not fully broken the " proposal agreement”"

You are never incentivised to raise malicious disputes. Yes the disputer may get some of the deposit of the other party but if the court functions correctly they will, in fact, lose money

That’s kind of a long answer but to your first question on how much must be staked to raise a dispute in the court. I’m not sure