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Governance

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Discussion around decentralized governance and governance models2 Servers

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28 Aug 2019
22:29:18@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <light>there is now tornado.cash but still this tool is immature and still presents many opportunities for users to shoot themselves (and other users) in the foot, which I’ve pointed out in my review here: https://lightco.in/2019/08/07/tornado-review/
3 Sep 2019
14:02:05@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <light>Interesting discussion: https://www.reddit.com/r/MakerDAO/comments/csia9r/makerdao_looking_for_governance/
6 Sep 2019
12:54:20@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <aaron>Governance panel with @jorge from Berlin https://youtu.be/Pk6G_AD0kSo
14 Sep 2019
08:50:11@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <ruby>Hey guys, a quick question. I’m reading the whitepaper and have some questions about the dispute part. it is indicated that " if a minority of the DAO stakeholders think the submitted proposal has violated the proposal agreement terms then they can choose to raise a dispute. When they raise a dispute they will need to deposit an equivalent amount of collateral, along with initial dispute fees as determined by the Aragon Court" . Have two questions here:

  1. how is the “proposal agreement determined”?
  2. is the amount of collateral refers to the amount of the budget associated with the respective proposal?
08:53:03@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <ruby>And also, it is indicated that if the result of dispute runs in favor of the disputers, the collateral of the proposal will be transferred to the disputer, does it mean that the original proposer need to send the original budget back to the DAO or to the disputers? If the budget were to some the disputers, will there be any risk that disputers will gain additional benefit in raising a dispute and they will intendly raise as much as dispute as possbile?
20:48:05@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <aaron>Hey @ruby so the proposal agreement is determined by all parties before they accept to interact. This could be a vote by the organisation to create some bylaws or manifesto, or could be a specific agreement with a contractor. For example the dao can have some bylaws saying “we will not pay for exchange listings of our token”. If someone decides to buy a bunch of tokens in our DAO and makes a proposal to do that. Even if they hold more than 51% of the tokens, any token holder can then raise a dispute and stop the vote executing.

A more serious example is when the same thing happens but instead of a token listing, an attacker can make a vote to transfer all the vault to their own address this is the primary motivation of the court

does it mean that the original proposer need to send the original budget back to the DAO or to the disputes

Not sure what you mean here. But all agreements are fully collateralized. Meaning you can only loose what you have staked. If you make a proposal and stake funds towards it, you can only loose that. A DAO cannot compel you so send it anymore than that

As for the amount of collateral @jorge @facuspagnuolo would be best to answer that. Hope that helps

15 Sep 2019
08:32:04@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <ruby>Thanks a lot @aaron, it does help a lot on the proposal agreement part. Just further clarify on the collateral question. Think I might be still lost in the proposal process here, as currently I have built a DAO on Aragon and when I make a proposal, it does not require any collateral, so just wanna make for clear about the proposal process:

  1. Community member make a proposal seeking for fund support from the DAO like 100 usdt, does he/she need to collateral some DAO token into the smart contract? and if yes , how much that could be
  2. In this situation , if the proposal is passed, he will be granted 100 usdt, and will he get his collateral back?
  3. In this situation, if the proposal is raised for any dispute here, and he lose in the dispute, does it mean that he will lose both his collateral and the fund he applied for?
08:32:08@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <ruby>sorry for intensive question
08:38:10@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <ruby>And here is the issue I raised about the “intention dispute”, if the disputer will receive the collateral of the original proposer, he /she might be incentived to raise dispute even the proposal has not fully broken the " proposal agreement"
08:38:43@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <ruby>Cause he/she might have the possibility to get additional benefit, which is the proposer’s original collateral, not sure if my understanding is correct
09:24:13@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <aaron>@ruby

Ok let me try and unpack it a bit with a disclaimer that I’m not an expert on this and I haven’t looked at the current spec

Community member make a proposal seeking for fund support from the DAO like 100 usdt, does he/she need to collateral some DAO token into the smart contract? and if yes, how much that could be

This would be up to the DAO and how it is configured. If you have the permissions set up such that anyone can request funds via voting then it makes sense for the DAO to require a deposit for each proposal (this is not an option right now with the current apps on the main net). The reason being the DAO is vulnerable to a spam attack where an attacker can flood the DAO with proposals hoping one of them sneak through.

In the case where the proposer challenges a no vote. For example, if it was a request for payment for services rendered and they did the work they were tasked with. then they would receive the deposit back and the requested funds and possibly a portion of the DAOs deposit (don’t quote me on the last one)

However, if they lose they will lose their deposit. It’s worth noting, they would never have had the funds applied for as it would be locked by the court

If you have the permissions set up such that only token holders in the DAO can request funds from the vault via voting, then it probably wouldn’t need to require depositing collateral as if a token holder is acting maliciously the DAO can vote to burn its tokens.

Again this could trigger a dispute at which point both parties would have to deposit collateral with the looser getting slashed

And here is the issue I raised about the “intention dispute”, if the disputer will receive the collateral of the original proposer, he /she might be incentivised to raise dispute even the proposal has not fully broken the " proposal agreement"

You are never incentivised to raise malicious disputes. Yes the disputer may get some of the deposit of the other party but if the court functions correctly they will, in fact, lose money

That’s kind of a long answer but to your first question on how much must be staked to raise a dispute in the court. I’m not sure

09:24:52@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <aaron>@ruby

Ok let me try and unpack it a bit with a disclaimer that I’m not an expert on this and I haven’t looked at the current spec

Community member make a proposal seeking for fund support from the DAO like 100 usdt, does he/she need to collateral some DAO token into the smart contract? and if yes, how much that could be

This would be up to the DAO and how it is configured. If you have the permissions set up such that anyone can request funds via voting then it makes sense for the DAO to require a deposit for each proposal (this is not an option right now with the current apps on the main net). The reason being the DAO is vulnerable to a spam attack where an attacker can flood the DAO with proposals hoping one of them sneak through.

In the case where the proposer challenges a no vote. For example, if it was a request for payment for services rendered and they did the work they were tasked with. then they would receive the deposit back and the requested funds and possibly a portion of the DAOs deposit (don’t quote me on the last one)

However, if they lose they will lose their deposit. It’s worth noting, they would never have had the funds applied for as it would be locked by the court

If you have the permissions set up such that only token holders in the DAO can request funds from the vault via voting, then it probably wouldn’t need to require depositing collateral as if a token holder is acting maliciously the DAO can vote to burn its tokens.

Again this could trigger a dispute at which point both parties would have to deposit collateral with the looser getting slashed

And here is the issue I raised about the “intention dispute”, if the disputer will receive the collateral of the original proposer, he /she might be incentivised to raise dispute even the proposal has not fully broken the " proposal agreement"

You are never incentivised to raise malicious disputes. Yes the disputer may get some of the deposit of the other party but if the court functions correctly they will, in fact, lose money

That’s kind of a long answer but to your first question on how much must be staked to raise a dispute in the court. I’m not sure

09:25:28@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <aaron>@ruby

Ok let me try and unpack it a bit with a disclaimer that I’m not an expert on this and I haven’t looked at the current spec

“Community member make a proposal seeking for fund support from the DAO like 100 usdt, does he/she need to collateral some DAO token into the smart contract? and if yes, how much that could be”

This would be up to the DAO and how it is configured. If you have the permissions set up such that anyone can request funds via voting then it makes sense for the DAO to require a deposit for each proposal (this is not an option right now with the current apps on the main net). The reason being the DAO is vulnerable to a spam attack where an attacker can flood the DAO with proposals hoping one of them sneak through.

In the case where the proposer challenges a no vote. For example, if it was a request for payment for services rendered and they did the work they were tasked with. then they would receive the deposit back and the requested funds and possibly a portion of the DAOs deposit (don’t quote me on the last one)

However, if they lose they will lose their deposit. It’s worth noting, they would never have had the funds applied for as it would be locked by the court

If you have the permissions set up such that only token holders in the DAO can request funds from the vault via voting, then it probably wouldn’t need to require depositing collateral as if a token holder is acting maliciously the DAO can vote to burn its tokens.

Again this could trigger a dispute at which point both parties would have to deposit collateral with the looser getting slashed

“And here is the issue I raised about the “intention dispute”, if the disputer will receive the collateral of the original proposer, he /she might be incentivised to raise dispute even the proposal has not fully broken the " proposal agreement”"

You are never incentivised to raise malicious disputes. Yes the disputer may get some of the deposit of the other party but if the court functions correctly they will, in fact, lose money

That’s kind of a long answer but to your first question on how much must be staked to raise a dispute in the court. I’m not sure

09:42:15@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <ruby>Understood, thanks a lot for the detailed answer. I was reading the whitepaper, so got some questions on this part, seems that we still need to run more senarios to test how this mechanism may function, to me, this mechanism may still have risk for the disputer to act maliciously, as the returns seems be larger than the cost even with the dispute court
09:42:55@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <ruby>As per my understanding, the court will be consist of junors that are mainly ANT holders that staked their ANTs into the court smart contract
09:43:37@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <ruby>Are we working on any project to further research on and even modeling mathematically on these governance mechanism in details?
10:58:08@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <aaron>When dealing with jurisprudence there is always risks that decisions don’t go your way however I’m pretty confident that there are protocol is secure.

Decisions can be appealed all the way up to include all acting jurors staked in the court. The very final desition will be decided by a futarchy market

10:58:58@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <aaron>There is some court simulation work done you can find that here https://github.com/aragonlabs/court-sim
10:59:43@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <aaron>Also there is a forum thread here https://forum.aragon.org/t/an-agent-based-simulation-and-analysis-of-aragons-court-mechanism/232?u=aaron
11:00:54@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <aaron>@jorge is leading the development on this so he will be able to go into much more detail about this
11:02:12@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <aaron>Also worth noting the protocol has been adapted from klerso.io which has been on main net for a little while now
11:35:13@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <ruby>Cool, very valuable information, will check the above works, thanks a lot Aaron!
13:37:51@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <aaron>No problem 🙂
16 Sep 2019
09:54:26@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <jorge>

is the amount of collateral refers to the amount of the budget associated with the respective proposal?

09:56:20@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <jorge>the amount of collateral needed to create a proposal is a parameter set in the Proposal Agreement (as the ‘agreement text’ itself), and it is constant for all proposals (as the amount of money at stake with a proposal is impossible to quantify, as a proposal could be upgrading a smart contract)
09:56:33@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <jorge>@ruby the amount of collateral needed to create a proposal is a parameter set in the Proposal Agreement (as the ‘agreement text’ itself), and it is constant for all proposals (as the amount of money at stake with a proposal is impossible to quantify, as a proposal could be upgrading a smart contract)
09:57:15@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <jorge>

Community member make a proposal seeking for fund support from the DAO like 100 usdt, does he/she need to collateral some DAO token into the smart contract? and if yes , how much that could be

09:59:19@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <jorge>every DAO will decide whether to install Proposal Agreements (it’s totally opt-in) and the DAO will be able to decide the proposal parameters: what token is used for collateral (e.g. ANT, DAI, the org’s native token or any ERC20). After Proposal Agreements is installed, creating proposals will require depositing such amount of collateral which is unlocked if the proposal is not challenged for a period of time
10:00:31@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <jorge>as Aaron points out, every DAO will decide whether to install Proposal Agreements (it’s totally opt-in) and the DAO will be able to decide the proposal parameters: what token is used for collateral (e.g. ANT, DAI, the org’s native token or any ERC20). After Proposal Agreements is installed, creating proposals will require depositing such amount of collateral which is unlocked if the proposal is not challenged for a period of time
19 Sep 2019
06:50:15@bridge-bot:matrix.orgbridge-bot <ruby> @jorge Thanks for the explanation Jorge, it’s more clear for me now, good info to be updated into my research

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