| 7 Oct 2019 |
 mhpanda | Daniell Mesquita: For practical considerations, no, community governance is not particularly obvious. One problem with community governance is work-load. Decision making takes time, especially if one wants to make informed decisions. While I think we can agree that there ought to be a mechanism for a community-based override, most people frankly do not have the time to invest in the majority of decision making activities on top of their daily activities. The second problem is that members of a community generally have specific fields of interests and competencies. This means that it is unlikely for an overwhelming majority of the community to be able to provide informed, competent decisions in any given topic. Of course, we already see this on a smaller scale with the performance of our elected reresentatives, who share the same lack of competencies in a number of their proposals and votes. The third problem is the workload for tallying votes, and assuring that all votes are valid (no double votes, no deleted votes, no modified votes, etc). | 09:21:44 |
| mhpanda | There is no perfect system of governance... and certainly not among the choices above. For a while now I have been working on developing a mixed system that activates differing models depending upon specific contextual situations; however, this system is designed for a natural mode of governance, rather than a software-based modality. | 09:26:07 |
| mhpanda | It should be assumed that all authority is derived from the community (Iprefer the term "constituency"). There should be various mechanisms to preserve this authority. First, any centralised government should consist of a representative body RANDOMLY SELECTED from the constituency at large. This body will authorise any and all items of legislation, and will also provide oversight over all other bodies (with full authority to remove any government official from any office at any time). A second mechanism would be a call to general referendum, with activation mechanisms available to officials within the central government, as well as seperate mechanisms that would be activated directly by the population. A well defined system of petition might be part of this mechanism, but might also act as a seperate (third) mechanism for ensuring communal authority over governance. | 09:36:45 |
| mhpanda | There should likewise be a more conservative body that is specifically charged with ensuring that original "political" intet of legislation is preserved. This would be a formally educated body. Original membership would be voted into office by the community at large; but replacement membership would be determined by remaining members, and selected from a pool of eligible candidates. This would essentially be a "senate" (literally, the equivalent of a council of elders). This body would not have authority to initiate legislation (except if it determines a need due to conflicting or ambiguous existing legislation), but would vote on all legislation to establish that suggested legislation is consistent with existing legislation. All negative votes would have to explicitely denote all potential conflicts (the only cceptable reason for a negative vote), and how such conflicts might be fixed. This senate would effectively serve as the highest level of judiciary. | 09:48:22 |
| mhpanda | It is sometimes beneficial to have a more centralised source for setting policy... which is why many governments have some form of presidency, monarchy, or other form of singular leadership. For obvious reasons, great care should be taken to ensure that such centralised positions are not granted too much power, or too many powers. Likewise, it should be fairly easy to remove a central leadership at any time that a "leader" fails to represent the constituency. Also, singular leaders seldom have broad scopes of competencies necessary for determining effectual and beneficial policies. I propose a "presiency" that consists of a central figure who remains in office so long as authorised polls of the constituency show actual majority support. A set number of pollsbelow 50% would activate a new campaign (where the existing official might, or might not, be eligible). There would also be representation in this presidency for a number of specific fields/disciplines... essentially comprising a "ministry". Delegates for these various administrative presidential offices would NOT be selected by constituents at large, but by constituents who have listed the specific field as their primary field. Candidates can not campaign, nor even unilaterally come forward as a candidate, but must be nominated by other members. The candidate who assumes the role of administrator, or "minister", in a given field will be the candidate with the greatest level of mutual support and confidence of others in the same declared field (voters can vote for any number of candidates simultaneously). The minister MUST demonstrate better than 50% support of consituents with the same declared field. Ministers will set policies for activities that fall within their field, and may jointly share policy-setting powers with other ministers who might have legitimite shared interests in a given policy. For these specialty policies, the "president" will only have policy-setting power in cases of split votes, or in determining whose policy gets priority over another. | 10:08:40 |
| 9 Oct 2019 |
 sean | mhpanda: Do you have a name for the governance model you're describing? Also, what are your thoughts on the Steering Council Model? | 00:14:35 |
| sean | https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-8016/ | 00:16:07 |
| 11 Oct 2019 |
| mhpanda | sean: I had not considered naming the model, but you could probably refer to it as a "composit" or "combinative" model, as it includes aspects from several different models described above. | 17:39:34 |
| mhpanda | sean: A steering council is okay, but the "broad authority" would require careful oversight, as governing officials very seldom limit themselves to "seek to exercise (authority) as rarely as possible". It is simply not in most human nature. My suggestion for a randomly selected representative body probably most closely fits with this steering council model. Abuses could be avoided with short durations of (rotated) service; as well as the mechanisms for the constituency at large to implement a mandatory referendum through a carefully and explicitely defined petition process. | 17:49:15 |
| 15 Oct 2019 |
|  blaj joined the room. | 10:36:51 |
| 30 Oct 2019 |
|  Ulf changed their display name from hffcc1 to Jonas. | 09:40:19 |
| 13 Dec 2019 |
|  clement joined the room. | 23:55:06 |
| 14 Dec 2019 |
|  @horst:feneas.org joined the room. | 14:17:52 |
|  @carry:bau-ha.us joined the room. | 16:10:06 |
| 17 Dec 2019 |
|  mowgli joined the room. | 21:53:17 |
|  martina joined the room. | 22:52:03 |
| 19 Dec 2019 |
|  peter joined the room. | 22:10:59 |
| 20 Dec 2019 |
|  @mikro2nd:matrix.org left the room. | 11:26:55 |
| 26 Dec 2019 |
|  magdalena joined the room. | 13:35:25 |
|  marian joined the room. | 15:55:22 |
| 31 Dec 2019 |
|  kunigunde joined the room. | 01:41:05 |
| 1 Jan 2020 |
|  @aleksander:junta.pl joined the room. | 23:37:53 |
| 5 Jan 2020 |
|  @antje_a:utwente.io joined the room. | 23:15:04 |
| 8 Jan 2020 |
|  @ronald:riotchat.de joined the room. | 23:16:28 |
| 9 Jan 2020 |
|  andreas joined the room. | 22:41:49 |
| 2 Feb 2020 |
|  nikolai joined the room. | 20:23:44 |
| 5 Feb 2020 |
| @antje_a:utwente.io left the room. | 14:11:29 |
| 7 Mar 2020 |
|  @akegalj:matrix.org joined the room. | 17:19:23 |
| @akegalj:matrix.org left the room. | 17:56:41 |
|  ni7e joined the room. | 18:02:49 |
