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SD-Governance

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Our Space will be centered around governance of our network, governance of our future civilizations and financial sustainability. 1 Servers

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2 May 2019
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5 May 2019
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20 Sep 2019
00:49:51@drbriefs:matrix.orgsean@room Hey space governance enthusiasts, I'd like to dedicate some time next month to draft a set of bylaws for space decentral. This was initially started with https://github.com/spacedecentral/SGPs, but it was particularly catered to be for software enhancements, not so much of a governance model. I may very much borrow heavily from Aragon's Governance Proposal repo https://github.com/aragon/AGPs. Are there any brave (preferably, GitHub-fluent) volunteers here that are willing to help review this redraft? Much thanks in advance, Sean
26 Sep 2019
08:41:52@drbriefs:matrix.orgsean

To whom it may be of interest, I've been looking over Python's PEP8000 and it seems we have at least 7 governance models to choose from. Being that I don't have a political science background, I would very much like to get other peoples feedback on these models, as it may lay the groundwork for how we operate future Space Decentral governance decisions (no pressure, right?)...

PEP 8010 - The Technical Leader Governance Model
This PEP proposes a continuation of the singular technical project leader model. Also within scope is whether an advisory council aids or supports the BDFL. This PEP does not name either the next BDFL, nor members of such an advisory council. For that, see PEP 13.

PEP 8011 - Python Governance Model Lead by Trio of Pythonistas
This PEP describes a new model of Python governance lead by a Trio of Pythonistas (TOP). It describes the role and responsibilities of the Trio. This PEP does not name members of the Trio. For that, see PEP 13.

PEP 8012 - The Community Governance Model
This is a placeholder PEP for a new model of Python governance based on consensus and voting, without the role of a centralized singular leader or a governing council. It describes how, when, and why votes are conducted for decisions affecting the Python language. It also describes the criteria for voting eligibility.

PEP 8013 - The External Governance Model
This PEP describes a new model of Python governance based on an external council who are responsible for ensuring good process. Elected by the core development team, this council may reject proposals that are not sufficiently detailed, do not consider all affected users, or are not appropriate for the upcoming release. This PEP does not name members of such a council. For that, see PEP 13.

PEP 8014 - The Commons Governance Model
This PEP describes a new model of Python governance based on a council of elders who are responsible for ensuring a PEP is supported by a sufficient majority of the Python community before being accepted. Unlike some of the other governance PEPs it explicitly does not specify who has voting rights and what a majority vote consists of. In stead this is determined by the council of elders on a case by case basis.

PEP 8015 - Organization of the Python community
This PEP formalizes the current organization of the Python community and proposes 3 main changes: formalize the existing concept of "Python teams"; give more autonomy to Python teams; replace the BDFL (Guido van Rossum) with a new "Python board" of 3 members which has limited roles, mostly decide how a PEP is approved (or rejected).

PEP 8016 - The Steering Council Model
This PEP proposes a model of Python governance based around a steering council. The council has broad authority, which they seek to exercise as rarely as possible; instead, they use this power to establish standard processes, like those proposed in the other 801x-series PEPs. This follows the general philosophy that it's better to split up large changes into a series of small changes that can be reviewed independently: instead of trying to do everything in one PEP, we focus on providing a minimal-but-solid foundation for further governance decisions.

09:06:37@drbriefs:matrix.orgseanYou can also listen to an interview with Brett Cannon on python's new governance model on https://talkpython.fm/episodes/show/209/inside-python-s-new-governance-model
27 Sep 2019
20:25:05@daniellmesquita:matrix.orgDaniell MesquitaCommunity, not obvious?
20:26:31@daniellmesquita:matrix.orgDaniell MesquitaCouncils, elders, lead
20:26:42@daniellmesquita:matrix.orgDaniell MesquitaAll these are based on old democracy. Monarchy also had lead (king), councils and elders
21:54:54@drbriefs:matrix.orgseanI think the community model could work. It's essentially what Rust uses https://www.rust-lang.org/governance It was also voted as python's 2nd most popular governance model after pep8016
7 Oct 2019
09:10:20@mhpanda:matrix.orgmhpanda Daniell Mesquita: Terraforming the moon is not feasible. Most importantly, because the lunar gravity is not sufficient to sustain any kind of real atmosphere (in terms of density and depth- or "thickness" if you prefer) for any meaningful length of time. One might also consider that terraforming itself might not be desirable, except for narrow-minded interests.
09:21:44@mhpanda:matrix.orgmhpanda Daniell Mesquita: For practical considerations, no, community governance is not particularly obvious. One problem with community governance is work-load. Decision making takes time, especially if one wants to make informed decisions. While I think we can agree that there ought to be a mechanism for a community-based override, most people frankly do not have the time to invest in the majority of decision making activities on top of their daily activities. The second problem is that members of a community generally have specific fields of interests and competencies. This means that it is unlikely for an overwhelming majority of the community to be able to provide informed, competent decisions in any given topic. Of course, we already see this on a smaller scale with the performance of our elected reresentatives, who share the same lack of competencies in a number of their proposals and votes. The third problem is the workload for tallying votes, and assuring that all votes are valid (no double votes, no deleted votes, no modified votes, etc).
09:26:07@mhpanda:matrix.orgmhpandaThere is no perfect system of governance... and certainly not among the choices above. For a while now I have been working on developing a mixed system that activates differing models depending upon specific contextual situations; however, this system is designed for a natural mode of governance, rather than a software-based modality.
09:36:45@mhpanda:matrix.orgmhpandaIt should be assumed that all authority is derived from the community (Iprefer the term "constituency"). There should be various mechanisms to preserve this authority. First, any centralised government should consist of a representative body RANDOMLY SELECTED from the constituency at large. This body will authorise any and all items of legislation, and will also provide oversight over all other bodies (with full authority to remove any government official from any office at any time). A second mechanism would be a call to general referendum, with activation mechanisms available to officials within the central government, as well as seperate mechanisms that would be activated directly by the population. A well defined system of petition might be part of this mechanism, but might also act as a seperate (third) mechanism for ensuring communal authority over governance.
09:48:22@mhpanda:matrix.orgmhpandaThere should likewise be a more conservative body that is specifically charged with ensuring that original "political" intet of legislation is preserved. This would be a formally educated body. Original membership would be voted into office by the community at large; but replacement membership would be determined by remaining members, and selected from a pool of eligible candidates. This would essentially be a "senate" (literally, the equivalent of a council of elders). This body would not have authority to initiate legislation (except if it determines a need due to conflicting or ambiguous existing legislation), but would vote on all legislation to establish that suggested legislation is consistent with existing legislation. All negative votes would have to explicitely denote all potential conflicts (the only cceptable reason for a negative vote), and how such conflicts might be fixed. This senate would effectively serve as the highest level of judiciary.
10:08:40@mhpanda:matrix.orgmhpandaIt is sometimes beneficial to have a more centralised source for setting policy... which is why many governments have some form of presidency, monarchy, or other form of singular leadership. For obvious reasons, great care should be taken to ensure that such centralised positions are not granted too much power, or too many powers. Likewise, it should be fairly easy to remove a central leadership at any time that a "leader" fails to represent the constituency. Also, singular leaders seldom have broad scopes of competencies necessary for determining effectual and beneficial policies. I propose a "presiency" that consists of a central figure who remains in office so long as authorised polls of the constituency show actual majority support. A set number of pollsbelow 50% would activate a new campaign (where the existing official might, or might not, be eligible). There would also be representation in this presidency for a number of specific fields/disciplines... essentially comprising a "ministry". Delegates for these various administrative presidential offices would NOT be selected by constituents at large, but by constituents who have listed the specific field as their primary field. Candidates can not campaign, nor even unilaterally come forward as a candidate, but must be nominated by other members. The candidate who assumes the role of administrator, or "minister", in a given field will be the candidate with the greatest level of mutual support and confidence of others in the same declared field (voters can vote for any number of candidates simultaneously). The minister MUST demonstrate better than 50% support of consituents with the same declared field. Ministers will set policies for activities that fall within their field, and may jointly share policy-setting powers with other ministers who might have legitimite shared interests in a given policy. For these specialty policies, the "president" will only have policy-setting power in cases of split votes, or in determining whose policy gets priority over another.
9 Oct 2019
00:14:35@drbriefs:matrix.orgsean mhpanda: Do you have a name for the governance model you're describing? Also, what are your thoughts on the Steering Council Model?
00:16:07@drbriefs:matrix.orgseanhttps://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-8016/
11 Oct 2019
17:39:34@mhpanda:matrix.orgmhpanda sean: I had not considered naming the model, but you could probably refer to it as a "composit" or "combinative" model, as it includes aspects from several different models described above.
17:49:15@mhpanda:matrix.orgmhpanda sean: A steering council is okay, but the "broad authority" would require careful oversight, as governing officials very seldom limit themselves to "seek to exercise (authority) as rarely as possible". It is simply not in most human nature. My suggestion for a randomly selected representative body probably most closely fits with this steering council model. Abuses could be avoided with short durations of (rotated) service; as well as the mechanisms for the constituency at large to implement a mandatory referendum through a carefully and explicitely defined petition process.
15 Oct 2019
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30 Oct 2019
09:40:19@hffcc1:matrix.orgJonas changed their display name from hffcc1 to Jonas.

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