| 26 Aug 2018 |
|  richardred joined the room. | 14:09:55 |
 Haon | Yep, that's a good approach | 16:20:37 |
| 27 Aug 2018 |
 @bridge:decred.org | [slack/Richard-Red] https://www.coindesk.com/with-nearly-200-million-on-the-line-eos-is-building-a-voting-system/ | 12:19:48 |
| Haon | Article about non-existent tech, classic. | 12:56:54 |
| @bridge:decred.org | [slack/Richard-Red] I thought it was quite interesting that there's discussion of burning the project fund and ditching that whole concept, curious to see how that unfolds when the referendum tool goes live | 17:31:06 |
| @bridge:decred.org | [slack/solar] >Every year, the supply rises by 5 percent, and four-fifths of that increase automatically goes into the account. This process is made possible by a funding mechanism that was coded into the EOS protocol at launch. | 17:36:56 |
| @bridge:decred.org | [slack/Richard-Red] yeah, so 80% of the new EOS, that's quite a lot | 17:37:32 |
| @bridge:decred.org | [slack/solar] >At the time, Blumer was responding to a Twitter user's observation that "even with the wonders of compounding," the 1 percent inflation that top block producers – those that verify transactions on the network – divvy up among themselves, might seem insufficient.
>As such, the user expected "whale" block producers –those that hold a large number of tokens – to go after the larger 4 percent inflation by awarding WPS contracts to themselves. | 17:37:48 |
| @bridge:decred.org | [slack/Richard-Red] I think that's how it will go, or some version of a higher % of inflation going to the BPs | 17:38:48 |
|  raedah joined the room. | 23:56:40 |
| 28 Aug 2018 |
| @bridge:decred.org | [slack/jy-p] ridiculous that articles get written about non-existent tech for other projects, and i've been told that some journos don't write about stuff that isn't released yet | 17:49:49 |
| @bridge:decred.org | [slack/jy-p] can you hear the SV circle jerk off in the distance? | 17:50:15 |
| @bridge:decred.org | [slack/dhill] sounded like people walking in mud and moaning about it | 17:58:49 |
| @bridge:decred.org | [slack/jy-p] lol | 18:03:03 |
|  thedecreddigest joined the room. | 19:05:49 |
|  dhillchanged room power levels. | 20:45:30 |
| dhillchanged room power levels. | 20:58:13 |
|  dezryth joined the room. | 21:55:48 |
| 29 Aug 2018 |
| @bridge:decred.org | [slack/decoy] been thinking about some of the silly treasury spending other projects have done and not wanting to see decred repeat the mistake. is it possible to have a variable proposal pass rate? one idea would be to develop a treasury spending curve over a period like 50 years and have the pass rate increase above 75% if we are overspending. pr would adjust similar to how the ticket price algorithm works. | 03:43:50 |
| @bridge:decred.org | [slack/Richard-Red] anything is possible, but I'm not sure what the value in a 50 year spending plan would be. it's also not exactly binding if it can be changed by the same mechanism/people that instituted it by a subsequent vote. Along similar lines though, I would make a distinction between spending the treasury's income and savings. I see that as something to track in a prominent location, rather than trying to make rules around it, at least to start with. | 07:38:50 |
| @bridge:decred.org | [slack/Richard-Red] supermajorities and quorums are aspects that are yet to be set, it makes sense that the quorum requirement at least is related to the scale of the proposal, maybe big spending proposals should require a supermajority too | 07:52:17 |
| richardred | Thinking about the discussion of Dash treasury from #random:decred.org yesterday (https://matrix.to/#/!NKtIRqGOEGaZvSQkKl:decred.org/$1535412921390luqAc:decred.org), one apparant difference between the Decred and Dash approaches thus far is that Decred's approach is more oriented towards finding and approving/hiring people, with those people having a good degree of autonomy in how they contribute in their area, guided by higher-level policies about what constitutes worthwhile work and what the right approach is to that work. The Dash Core group undoubtedly does this to some degree too, but the whole master node voting treasury system is much more geared towards rigidly defined projects. The people working on those projects are a secondary concern and often largely unknown to the community. Almost all of the proposals I'm aware of that seemed to return reasonable value for money were proposed by people that already had, or established, a sustained presence in the community. | 16:13:34 |
| @bridge:decred.org | [slack/jy-p] that's precisely the pattern i've nosed out running DHG. the ppl who show up and demonstrate their skills are the ones who end up making meaningful contributions | 17:16:48 |
| @bridge:decred.org | [slack/jy-p] ppl who show up and want to get paid to do X straightaway often bill a bunch and don't deliver | 17:17:21 |
| 30 Aug 2018 |
| Room Avatar Renderer. | 00:09:53 |
 bee | richardred: so is it correct that Dash spends every months treasury's block rewards and burns the unspent? Don't they save anything? | 11:36:01 |
| bee | sorry for lame question, not following them much | 11:36:16 |
| richardred | bee: that's how their treasury is configured, yes | 11:36:35 |
| bee | really weird incentive structure to my biased eye | 11:36:59 |
| richardred | over time, some aspect of "savings" has crept in, mostly through escrow providers who sometimes arrange with the proposer to handle payouts in USD. On at least a few occasions, an Escrow provider has received the payout (let's say $1000) when Dash is say $200, when the proposer finishes their work and asks to receive the Dash, it is worth $400, so they get half of the Dash the escrow provider was holding for them. The rest is a kind of saving, usually the proposer makes another proposal to do more of the same work so they can get what's left of the Dash | 11:39:52 |
